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BernardRudden
Contract Law in the USSR and the United States: History and General Concept. E. Allan Farnsworth & Viktor P. Mozolin. Washington: International Law Institute, 1987. Pp. 350. Cloth.
This work represents the first in a series on contract law jointly produced by the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., and the
Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Volume 1
appears in both English and Russian, and promised successors
(described as "upcoming" by the publisher) will cover required terms
and adhesion contracts' and sales contracts. 2 Such a collaborative venture is both novel and exciting, and the first volume-since it "fixes the
serious
working methodology for the entire series" 3 -merits
consideration.
The chosen approach is avowedly doctrinal and non-comparative.
The book falls into two halves, in each of which a distinguished specialist
describes the law of his own country. Both halves follow the same plan,
dividing their treatment into the following five chapters: the concept of
contract; its history; the sources of contract law; the characteristics and
organization of contract law (i.e. the birth, life, death, and afterlife of a
contract); and the settlement of disputes (mainly the court and arbitral
systems).
The American contribution constitutes the second part of the volume. It will be treated briefly, certainly not from reasons of disrespect
for the Reporter to the great Restatement Second on Contracts, 4 but
because this review is of the English-language edition. It can be
assumed that most readers are already acquainted with a capitalist system's approach to contract; indeed, the text prepared for this work
seems in large measure a precis (with the necessary generalization and
re-organization) of Farnsworth's magisterial treatise on contracts.5 No
doubt the reviewers of the Russian-language version will have much to
say about what they learn from him, and it is tempting to try to predict
their reactions. They likely will note that, in typically common-law fashion, the author devotes only 12 pages to the concept of contract, 6 while
1. T. VUKOWICH, V. YAKOVLEV, & M. SHIMINov, THE ExTENT OF THE POWER TO
CONTRACT: REQUIRED TERMS AND CONTRACTS OF ADHESION. Volume 2 is expected to

be published in 1988.
2. V. MOZOLIN & R. SUMMERS, THE
published in 1990.
3. E. FARNSWORTH & V. MOZOLIN,

LAW OF SALES. Volume

3 is expected to be

CONTRACT LAW IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE
UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND GENERAL CONCEPT xi (1987).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)' OF CONTRACTS (1982).
5. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1982).

6. Supra note 3, at 177-88.
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giving its history 31 pages 7 and its birth, life, death and afterlife 79
pages. 8 Government contracts, on the other hand, are accorded no special treatment. Soviet reviewers would probably be impressed by the
common-law's economic rationalization, but profoundly puzzled by
some of its legal doctrine. They will see that the author immediately,
even eagerly, embraces a definition of contract which obliges him to
deny that a swap or a cash sale is a contract. 9 They may think that there
is something sad about such an approach; and who can blame them?
Having learned on the first page of Farnsworth's account that "the law
10
they
of contracts is confined to promises that the law will enforce,"
will discover later that "enforcement" is not a literal term at common
law, that the law's "preoccupation is not with the question of how
promisors can be made to keep their promises"' but instead that "the
award of damages is the common form of relief. Virtually any breach
gives the injured party a claim for damages."'12 At this point the Russian
readers' bewilderment will deepen less at the substitution of damages
for enforcement than at the explanation that contracts are not strictly
enforced. Surely, they will think, some fifty percent of all contracting
parties are merely buyers of goods and services or borrowers of cash
who undertake only to pay (or repay) money; surely suits for the price of
goods sold and services supplied, or for the repayment of money lent,
are by far the most numerous, and certainly the most successful, of all
contract actions. And surely-above all in a capitalist economy-the
defendants are made to pay (and their property is liable for) not damages, but the sum agreed. The American system, they will therefore
think, like any other, specifically and routinely enforces most contractual
promises.
Mozolin's chapters are written in the rather colorless language of
much Soviet legal scholarship. Some of the flavor, of course, may have
been lost in translation; however, a perusal of the author's other works
in Russian suggests that the English version is fairly faithful to his prosestyle. He begins by emphasizing that, to understand the Soviet contract,
the reader must understand both its legal conception and its social purpose; and Mozolin soon makes it clear that the latter is by far the more
distinctive feature. He summarizes succinctly:
Commodity-and-money relations nevertheless differ from relations found
in market-oriented Western countries and have at least four distinctive
features. First, labor is not regarded as a commodity. Second, major
7. Supra note 3, at 189-220.
8. Supra note 3, at 233-312.
9. Supra note 3, at 178. Farnsworth relies on the Restatement's future-regarding

element of an enforceable contract: "Because no promise is given in either of these

exchanges, there is no contract. No question of the law of contracts arises unless the
dispute is open over a promise-a commitment as to future behavior." Id.
10. Supra note 3, at 178
11. Supra note 3, at 296-97.
12. Supra note 3, at 302. See also id. at 306 where Farnsworth discusses the remedy of specific performance.
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resources, such as land, water, timber, minerals in the ground, industry,
and communications are excluded from commodity-and-money relations.
Third, prices are in most cases fixed not by the contracting parties but by
the state. Fourth,3 commodity-and-money relations are constrained by a
planning system.'
This last feature needs to be stressed. "Under socialism," Mozolin
14
writes, "by its very essence, the economy can only be a planned one."
The Western reader who buys a pencil takes for granted that the path
from the forest to the object on the desk has traveled through free markets in land, timber, transport, labor, insurance, and countless other
things. Indeed, it is in these scores of "upstream" contracts that the
traditional model holds most true for Western law (a point well illustrated by Farnsworth in the early pages of his account). 5 In the Soviet
Union, however, the land and the forest are state property, the undertakings involved are all state enterprises, the workers are state employees, and the pencil's path is planned up to its arrival at the local store,
where it sells at a retail price fixed by the State. Only the final act of
purchase cannot be imposed by "the Plan"' 6 on a Soviet citizen: Article
4 of the USSR Fundamentals of Civil Legislation 1961 provides that
civil-law rights and duties (in this example, contract) can arise from
7
planning only for State, cooperative, and public bodies.'
Yet the USSR no longer relies on plan alone to achieve the collaboration required at the upstream stages of production. Contracts are
made between the manufacturing, service, and distribution enterprises
involved, penalty clauses are written into them, and breach is penalized.
The parties, however, cannot make unplanned contracts and must make
those which the plan requires. This inter-relationship of plan and contract is difficult to understand and Mozolin's account' 8 is not particu13. Supra note 3, at 13.
14. Supra note 3, at 30.
15. Supra note 3, at 181-183.
16. Mozolin defines the "Plan" as
an administrative document that serves as the basis for making the contract.... This is not the same as a production plan of an integrated unit (or
enterprise), which is formed on the basis of contracts made and orders
received by the integrated unit (or enterprise) and affirmed by superordinate

agencies. These plans are related, however, and they are coordinated by
ministries, agencies, and other administrative organs, which carry out supervision of the integrated units and enterprises.
Supra note 3, at 28 n. 39.
17. Supra note 3, at 116-18. Article 4 of the U.S.S.R. Fundamentals of Civil Legislation codifies the "Grounds from which Civil Rights and Duties Arise." The
grounds are "provided for by the legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics, and also from the acts of citizens and organizations which, while not provided for
by law, give rise to civil rights and duties in virtue of the general principles and meaning of civil legislation." FUNDAMENTALS OF CIVIL LEGISLATION OF THE U.S.S.R. AND

THE UNION REPUBLICS, at 12, art. 4 (1968) (translated from the Russian text into
English). As pertains specifically to contracts, the Article states that rights arise
"from transactions provided for by law and ... which, while not provided for by law,
do not contradict it." Id.
18. Supra note 3, at 26-36.
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larly illuminating, but then neither are those of the authors whose works
he summarizes.' 9 Much clearer, for an insight into the content of contract in a planned economy, is his description of the terms inserted by
legislation into the vast majority of contracts. These normally include
the price, the warranties of quality, the manner of payment, and almost
all other matters in state-imposed standard contracts involving the ordinary citizen in long-term legal relationships. 20 The work was presumably written too early to include discussion of the recent (1986)
amendment to the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation which
seems to suggest a shrinking of the contractual autonomy of ordinary
people. Article 40(2) provides that where two private citizens make a
contract they can fix the price themselves; to this has now been added
the phrase "except as otherwise provided by legislation."
If the function of contract in the Soviet Union remains hard to
grasp, its purely legal constructs are much more familiar, bearing a close
relationship to the Roman-derived systems of the Civil Law. The author
accepts that "the legal concept of contract retained its basic features,
similar to those found in the legal systems of other countries," 21 and
inevitably his description of the very basic legal notions stirs many a
memory of other, older systems. Contracts arise "by the will of the parties, on the basis of an agreement between them;" 2 2 they create relations in personam, not in rem. 23 They comprise a sub-set of juridical acts
("transactions" in the book, but not in the index) described as "actions
of individuals and organizations directed toward establishing, modifying, or terminating rights and duties" 24-the phrase could have come
straight from a 19th-century German textbook. From similar sources
comes the distinction between legal capacity and legal ability; indeed the
Russian words are calques of the useful German terms (e.g. Rechtsfi'higkeit/pravosposobnost'), and are none the worse for that.
Soviet law does not define the legal concept of a contract. Instead,
it defines obligation in terms which reproduce the essence of the California Civil Code 2 5 (enacted in 1872), but are no doubt derived from the
civil code of Germany: The legal situation where one person (the
debtor) is bound to another person (the creditor) to perform in favor of
19. See, e.g., Kravtsov, Planovye obiazatel'siva [Planning Obligations] (1980);

Agarkov, Obiazatersivo po sovetskomu grazhdanskomu pravu [Obligations Under Soviet

Civil Law] (1940); Kykov, Plan i Khoziaistvennyi dogovor [The Plan and the Economic
Contract] (1975).

20. Examples of such long-term relationships are the residential lease, the rental
of household appliances, and the whole range of insurance policies.
21. Supra note 3, at 47. See also id. at 114 n. 6, for Mozolin's list of commentators
on this point.
22. Supra note 3, at 9.
23. Supra note 3, at 9-10 ("A contractual obligation ... establishes legal ties only
between the parties participating in the contract.").
24. Supra note 3, at 5.
25. California Civil Code § 1427 defines obligation as "a legal duty, by which a
person is bound to do or not do a certain thing." CAL. CiV. CODE § 1427 (West,
1982).
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another some defined action or to refrain therefrom, with the creditor
having the right to require performance. 2 6 Having defined obligation,
Soviet law, using a technique ultimately derived from Gaius' Institutes
3.88 (c. 160 A.D.), states that obligations arise from contracts and from
other grounds. 27 The law then defines what makes a contract, enumerating a number of perfectly sensible rules covering the details of offer
and acceptance and the various vices of mistake, duress, and the like. 28
The main distinction between the formal rules of the Soviet system and
those of other civil-law countries lies in the remedies-payment of a
penalty plus specific performance 29 -and here Mozolin lucidly explains
the Soviet rationale:
[U]nder the conditions of a planned economy, and in the absence of a
free market, the sums of money received by the obligee in place of performance of the contract.., will not, as a rule, protect the property interests violated by the nonperformance of the contract. The obligee is not in
a position to purchase elsewhere the goods that the obligor should have
supplied ....

30

To the Western lawyer, the most important feature of the doctrine
of freedom of contract is that the law simply gives its subjects a kitagreement, capacity, and (in some countries) consideration-and says
"go ye and stay licit." Provided the parties do just that they may make
any kind of contract they like. This is presumably the basic position in
the USSR but it is not entirely clear whether Mozolin accepts this or
thinks there is only a numerus clausus of permitted contractual figures (the
index is no help). As an illustration of his ambiguity, Mozolin states that
"Soviet civil law takes the position that contracts are to be openly
listed;"'' l however, the gist of his observations in several other places
suggests that, if a particular type of contract is not provided for by legislation, then it is not allowed. He thus seems doubtful of the validity of a
contractual obligation not to do something 32 (if he is right, then the
Soviet system was described about A.D. 200 by the Roman jurist Julius
Paulus: D 44.7.3.pr.). Similarly, he points out that "the character of
contractual relations is in many respects predetermined by the system of
legal regulations that is established for individual forms of property."' 33
In discussing contracts between individuals and socialist organizations,
he says that "only individual types of such contracts are laid down in
26. German Civil Code § 241 ["Verpflichtung zur Leistung"] states that "by virtue of an obligation the creditor is entitled to claim performance from the debtor.
The performance can also be forbearing to act." Das Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch § 241
(1960) (translated from German).

27. See supra note 3, at 8. See also FUNDAMENTALS

OF CIVIL LEGISLATION,supra note

18, at 31 (art. 33). Note that although Mozolin discusses this point, it is not listed in
the index.
28. FUNDAMENTALS OF CIVIL LEGISLATION, supra note 18, at 31-35 (arts. 33-38).
29. Supra note 18, at 33-34 (art. 36).
30. Supra note 3, at 148.
31. Supra note 3, at 116.
32. Supra note 3, at 10.
33. Supra note 3, at 16.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol 21

[legislation]" while "detailed regulations are given in subordinate
rules."'34 Finally, he says (and it is interesting that it should need saying)
"contracts not provided for by subordinate rules are also considered
enforceable if they do not contradict the law, but they are not often
used." 35
Mozolin's half of the book has three main weaknesses. First, the
author often obscures the book's structure by giving too much detail in
many places. Thus, at one point he provides a lengthy list of objects
which are extra commercium,3 6 while at another he spells out the long
names, dates, and references of some 30 pieces of subordinate legislation on contracts. 37 Second, Mozolin frequently covers a number of the
difficult areas, including much of the historical survey (which begins in
1917), by merely recounting brief, and somewhat arid, summaries of
competing professorial arguments (once again, with lists of citations). 38
Moreover, Mozolin cites many authorities, but all are in Russian. To the
reader without knowledge of the language, they are useless; to the
reader who knows Russian, they are unnecessary since he or she ought
to be able to find the references in the standard Russian-language
works. Presumably, they are included in the English-language version of
the volume in the expectation that someone will use them; the attempt
by one reader to follow up some of the authorities quoted, however,
revealed the third weakness of Mozolin's half of the book: its inaccurate
citations, of which this reviewer found many.39
34. Supra note 3, at 109.
35. Supra note 3, at 117. See also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
36. Supra note 3, at 15-16.
37. Supra note 3, at 93-94.
38. A noteworthy omission, by the way, is the great jurist Olimpiad S. Ioffe. Happily, he is now a professor at the University of Connecticut Law School at Hartford,
and his recent book, Soviet Civil Law (1988), bids fair to become a classic.
39. Among the more noticeable were the following. The case discussed at pp. 6-7
is cited to a non-existent number of the RSFSR Law Reports. The correct reference
to the provision cited at p. 14 line 3 is 21; the number given by the author is that of
the corresponding article in the RSFSR Civil Code. The legal provision quoted in
full at p. 21 is not from the legislation given (and itself incorrectly cited-it is item
120). The actual source is the Government Decree of 15 May 1986 (SP SSSR 1986
No. 21, item 121). The year whose Plan is discussed at p. 38 n. 62 should be 1987.
The sub-title of Pashukanis's book mentioned at p. 63 n. 45 should be englished as
"An Essay in Criticism" rather than "An Expert Critique." At pp. 98-99 Mozolin
discusses a case whose "reasoning is ... of fundamental importance," but he does
not explain why it was held by the RSFSR Supreme Court that the customer injured
by a defective product cannot sue the manufacturer in tort until the contractual
action against the store is barred by expiration of the guarantee period (neither does
the judgment); and the correct citation to the USSR Supreme Court's ruling on contractual warranties and products liability is to the 1985 BULL. VERKH. SUDA SSSR (No.
3) p. 13, at p. 17, # 19. At p. 105, contracts between citizens are dealt with by article
35 of the FUNDAMENTALS OF CIVIL LEGISLATION; the effect of mistake on transactions
is covered by article 57 of the RSFSR Civil code, not the number given at p. 114; and
conditions are dealt with by article 61, not that cited at p. 119. On p. 115 the final
reference in the text should be to the FUNDAMENTALS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, not of
CIVIL LEGISLATION.
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An attempt to follow up some of the author's references led to one
most interesting example of the present tensions in Soviet contract law
and of the interaction between these tensions and the constitutional
organs of power in the USSR. The Gorbachev doctrine of perestroika
seeks to stimulate domestic initiative and enterprise, two areas of human
activity which have traditionally made wide use of the contract, whether
of collaboration (partnership, the firm) or of exchange (sale of goods,
supply of services). Thus the USSR Supreme Soviet (the constitutional
legislator) enacted a Statute on Individual Labor Activity. 40 The statute
addresses "socially useful activity for the production of wares and supply
of remunerated services, not connected with the supplier's labor relation" (i.e., his or her steady job), and asserts that "the state encourages
citizens to enter into contracts and to form voluntary societies and
41
associations."
Notwithstanding perestroika, other organs are working in the opposite direction. The dangers to the socialist economy of unbridled contractual initiative are evident and are vividly illustrated in Issue No. 21 of
the 1986 USSR Government Decrees, Sobranie PostanovIenii Pravitel'stva
SSSR. The Issue contains three texts, each from a different source: the
Party Central Committee, the legislative "standing committee," and the
executive. The number is devoted to a single topic: "Strengthening the
Struggle against Unearned Income" (where the adjective "unearned"
(netrudovoi) means literally "untoiled-for"-acquired, that is, outside the
officially authorized ways of earning a living).
The Communist Party, defined in Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution
as "the guiding and directing force of Soviet society and the nucleus of
its political system and state and social organizations," has a similar
Decree (postanovlenie, Item 119). The Party's message follows a stylistic
pattern found in much Soviet law-making: first the good news; thenintroduced by "however" or some such phrase-the bad; and finally the
exhortation to numerous other bodies to put things right. So we read
that
the toilers of the Soviet Union have assumed as their heartfelt concern
(kak svoe krovnoe delo) the tasks laid down by the 27th Party Congress of
speeding up the socio-economic development of the country, and, by selfdenying toil in all sectors of the national economy, of steadily ensuring
the increase of the social inheritance.... Throughout the country there
is manifest a constant care for increasing the standing of honorable
highly-productive toil ...and for the further strengthening of state and
social control of measures of toil and consumption. 42
Alongside this, however,
there are not a few situations where people acquire unearned income,
engage in pilferage, speculation, bribery and other types of unlawful
40. Enacted on Nov. 19, 1986.
41. VED. VERKH. SOy. SSSR 1986 No. 47, § 964, art. 1 (abridged quotation)
[translated by author].
42. SP SSSR, Item 119 (translated by author).
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activity. Some of them use state resources for gain . ..or exact extra
services. In
payments for their services in trade, communal, and medical
43
some Soviet families money-grabbing is not condemned.
Almost four pages of instructions follow, to the legislative Presidium,
the Government, the Ministries, local authorities, the Procurator, the
MD, in short the whole gamut of Party, State, regional and other official organs. 44 These bodies are to take the appropriate concrete measures to "use the whole force of the law against those living beyond their
[official] means (ne po sredstvam)."'4 5 As well as the law, all other means
of "propaganda and agitation" are to be deployed: thus Goskino, the
State movie industry, is told to make films which will "foster in Soviet
hearts implacable hostility to the psychology of private property and
' '4 6
other antitheses of Communist morality.
Even the highest reaches of the Government have responded to the
Party's call. According to the 1977 Constitution, article 128, "the USSR
Council of Ministers [the Government] is the highest executive and
administrative agency of state power of the USSR. ' 4 7 In implementing
the Party directive quoted above, the Government Decree (Item 121)
proceeds to pass on the message to lower agencies, instructing factories
to tighten work discipline, auditors to scrutinize books, the State Bank to
handle all contracts between citizens and State organizations for over
5,000 rubles, and so on.
Finally, the "Standing Committee" of the Supreme Soviet has made
the necessary changes to the legislation in force in Item 120, an Edict
(ukaz) of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. 48 Most of the Edict is
concerned with other matters, 4 9 but one provision deserves special
attention in this review, as it vividly illustrates the problem of fitting
individual enterprise and freedom of contract into the context of the
socialist system. All basic prices are planned and, for entirely virtuous
reasons, those of important consumer products are kept very low: the
troublesome result is that bread costs less than cattle-cake and henfood.
43. Id.
44. The only institution not addressed by the Party is the Courts; thus scrupulously observing constitutional propriety, since article 155 of the 1977 Constitution
lays down that judges are "independent and subject only to law." This limitation
does not, of course, stop the courts themselves from spontaneously taking the Party
line to heart, and the 1986 volume of the USSR Supreme Court Reports contains a
lengthy (though abridged) account of an address to the Full Bench by its President
on the importance of the 27th Party Congress for the work of the judiciary. BULL.
VERKH. SUDA SSSR 1986 No. 3, p. 4.

45. SP SSSR, Item 119 (translated by author)
46. SP SSSR, Item 119 (translated by author)
47. Konst. SSSR Art. 128.
48. Under the Constitution, legislative power belongs to the (bi-cameral) directly
elected Supreme Soviet; but, as this body meets infrequently, it elects a Presidium of
some 40 members which, among many other things, makes laws in the intervals
between "parliamentary" sessions; they are then presented to the legislature for confirmation, but in practice this always occurs.
49. Imposing or increasing administrative and penal sanctions for failure to file
income returns, use of State vehicles for private gain and similar matters.
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If, for some reason, this happened in the West, the market would solve
the problem, however imperfectly. The Soviet Union instead uses the
criminal law. Article 5 of the Edict penalizes (with up to two years corrective labor for the worst cases) "the purchase of bread to feed to cattle
and fowl; and also feeding cattle and fowl on bread bought in the
shops."

